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UPDATING OHIO'S MEDICAL PRACTICE ACT (O.R.C. 4731):
AUTOMATIC AND SUMMARY SUSPENSIONS
OF PHYSICIANS' LICENSES
In recent years, many states have updated their medical practice acts.' Often,
the reforms have been prompted by newspaper exposds2 which criticized various
state medical boards for being too lax in their enforcement of medical profes-
sional standards.
3
In April, 1985, The Plain Dealer followed suit, running a series of articles
entitled "Doctoring The Truth. ' 4 Subsequently, a special Ohio House subcom-
mittee investigated the Ohio State Medical Board.5 On November 21, 1986, the
investigation culminated in the passage of Amended Substitute House Bill No.
769.6 The Act became effective on March 17, 1987.!
The main purpose of this comment is to review two major areas of change
in Ohio's Medical Practice Act. The first area deals with automatic sus-
pensions8 of physicians' licenses. The second area deals with summary
suspensions9 of physicians' licenses. In both of these areas, the Ohio State
Medical Board now has the authority to suspend a physician's license before
conducting a disciplinary hearing.'0
Part I of this comment begins by reviewing the current composition of the
Board so that the reader will understand how the Board functions in taking
disciplinary action against a physician. Part I then explains the new provisions
governing automatic and summary suspensions of physicians' licenses. Part I
also points out several sections of the new Medical Practice Act which appear
to be in conflict with other sections of the Ohio Revised Code, and offers some
possible resolutions. Part II begins by analyzing the physician's right to prac-
tice medicine. Part II then discusses whether Ohio's Medical Practice Act allows
IFeinstein, The Ethics Of Professional Regulation, 312(12) NEw ENG. J. MED. 801, 802 (1985).
2 1d. Kusserow et al., An Overview Of State Medical Discipline, 257(6) J. A.M.A. 820, 821 (1987); Porter,
The Ohio State Medical Board. An Interim Report, 82(10) OHmo ST. MED. J. 677, 677 (1986).
3 Relman, Professional Regulation And The State Medical Boards, 312(12) NEw ENG. J. MED. 784, 785
(1985).
4Webb, Doctoring The Truth, Cleve. Plain Dealer, [series beginning] Apr. 7, 1985, at 7-Al, col. 1. This
series of articles gives an interesting, although somewhat sensationalized, version of the disciplinary prob-
lems existing in the medical profession.
5Porter, supra note 2, at 677. State Representative John D. Thompson, Jr. headed the special House sub-
committee. Id.
6Ohio Amended Substitute House Bill No. 769 (1986 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-792) (Baldwin).
7Id. In amending Ohio's Medical Practice Act, the legislature relied on A Guide To The Essentials Of
A Modem Medical Practice Act, as well as the medical practice acts of various other states. Attorney Lauren
Lubow. Ms. Lubow is employed by the Ohio State Medical Board as "case controller." The writer of this
comment interviewed Ms. Lubow, by phone, on January 15, 1988.
8 OH10 REV. CODE ANN. § 4731.22(F) (Baldwin Supp. 1987).
9OHto REV. CODE ANN. § 4731.22(D) (Baldwin Supp. 1987).
'O1d.; OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4731.22(F) (Baldwin Supp. 1987).
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the Board to deprive a physician of that right, while still protecting the physi-
cian's due process rights.
PART I
Members Of The Board
As amended, O.R.C. Sec. 4731.01 provides that the Ohio State Medical
Board be composed of twelve appointed members.'I Seven members must hold
the degree of doctor of medicine.1 2 One member must hold the degree of doc-
tor of osteopathy. 3 One member must hold the degree of doctor of podiatric
medicine.14 Three members must represent consumer interests, with two of the
three consumer members prohibited from being associated with a health care
provider or profession. 5 The only change in O.R.C. Sec. 4731.01 is the addi-
tion of a second consumer member prohibited from being associated with a
health care provider or profession.' 6 The addition follows a nationwide trend;
most state medical boards now have at least one or two non-physician members.'
7
While attempting to provide for consumers' interests, Ohio has also at-
tempted to protect physicians' interests by requiring the majority of the Board
to be made up of physicians.'8 The majority requirement is important to Ohio
physicians because Ohio permits the Board to use its own expertise to deter-
mine whether a physician has breached the minimum standard of care.' 9
Officers Of The Board
As amended, O.R.C. Sec. 4731.02 provides for the Board to elect three
officers.2 The first officer is the president, who must be a board member.2'
The second officer is the supervising member, who also must be a board
"IOHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4731.01 (Baldwin Supp. 1987).
'
2
1d-
13Id .
14/d
.
15Id.
16 Ohio Legis. Serv. Commission, [material on] Am. Sub. H.B. 769 (as passed by the House), 116th Gen.
Assembly (1985-86), at 20. Before the amendment, the Board had only eleven members, two of whom
were consumer members. Id.
17Kusserow et al., supra note 2, at 822.
"The Federation of State Medical Boards of the United States recommends that physicians constitute the
majority of board membership. Fed. St. Med. Boards U.S., A Guide To The Essentials Of A Modern Medical
Practice Act, § I(E), at 5 (1985).
'9 Arlen v. State, 61 Ohio St.2d 168, 172-73, 399 N.E.2d 1251, 1254-55 (1980). The courts view the Board
as possessing its own expertise. Id. Therefore, additional expert testimony is not required. Id. For a general
discussion on expert testimony during medical board proceedings, see Annotation, Admissibility and Necessity
of Expert Evidence in Proceeding for Revocation of License of Physician, Surgeon, or Dentist, 6 A.L.R.2d
675 (1949).
20 OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 4731.02 (Baldwin Supp. 1986). The Board elects each of its officers to a one-
year term. Id.
2 Id.
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member.22 The third officer is the secretary, who must be a physician in good
standing in her/his profession.?3 The secretary does not have to be a board
member.
2 4
As amended, O.R.C. Sec. 4731.22(C)(1) provides that the supervising
member and the secretary shall function together to oversee any investigations
into violations of medical practice which the Board conducts.25 Formerly, in-
dividual board members were selected on a rotating basis to oversee investiga-
tions.26 Although the secretary and the supervising member are normally sup-
posed to oversee any investigations, the president has the power to replace the
supervising member with another board member,27 if a particular case falls
within that board member's area of professional expertise.28 The new law re-
tains the rule that any member who supervises the investigation of a case is
prohibited from participating in further adjudication of the case.
29
Attorney Hearing Examiner
The most significant addition to the Board's staff is the position of attorney
hearing examiner.30 O.R.C. Sec. 4731.23(A) provides that the Board must employ
an attorney 31 to serve as a hearing examiner in any hearing which the Board
has power 32 to conduct.3 3 The position of hearing examiner replaces the former
position of hearing officer, which was held by a board member.34 Providing
for an attorney hearing examiner allows the entire Board (except for the super-
vising member)3 5 to take part in the final adjudication of the case
3 6
The attorney hearing examiner's function is to conduct the hearing, con-
sider all of the evidence, and then prepare written proposed findings of fact
221d. The supervising member replaces the former position of treasurer. [material on] Am. Sub. H.B.
769 (as passed by the House, supra note 16, at 20.
23[material on] Am. Sub. H.B. 769 (as passed by the House), supra note 16, at 20.
24Id. at 19.
25OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 4731.22(C)(1) (Baldwin Supp. 1987); [material on] Am. Sub. H.B. 769 (as
passed by the House), supra note 16, at 20.
26 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 4731.22(D)(1) (Baldwin 1984) (amended 1986).
2OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 4731.22(C)(1) (Baldwin Supp. 1987).
28 [material on] Am. Sub. H.B. 769 (as passed by the House), supra note 16, at 20.
29 0Hio REv. CODE ANN. § 4731.22(C)(1) (Baldwin Supp. 1986); [material on] Am. Sub. H.B. 769 (as
passed by the House), supra note 14, at 17.
30
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4731.23(A) (Baldwin Supp. 1987).
31 The attorney must be an administrative law attorney examiner, or an administrative law attorney ex-
aminer administrator under the state job classification plan in OHIO REV. CODE § 124.14. Id.
32 As a state administrative agency, the Board's power to conduct adjudication hearings is pursuant to OHIO
REV. CODE § 119 - Administrative Procedure. Id.
331d.
34 [material on] Am. Sub. H.B. 769 (as passed by the House), supra, note 16, at 17.
3As previously noted, a member who has investigated a case cannot take part in the adjudication of that
case. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4731.22(C)(1) (Baldwin Supp. 1987).
36[material on] Am. Sub. H.B. 769 (as passed by the House), supra note 16, at 17.
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and conclusions of law? 7 Within thirty days of the hearing's conclusion, the
attorney hearing examiner must submit the written proposals to the Board for
its consideration? 8 After receiving the hearing examiner's proposals, the Board
has sixty days to render a final decision and take action in the case 9 If the
Board votes40 to suspend or revoke a physician's license, the physician has the
right to appeal 4' to the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.42 Pending
appeal, the court may suspend the Board's order if it appears that: (1) execution
of the Board's order will result in unusual hardship to the physician, and
(2) suspension of the Board's order will not result in a threat to the public's
health, safety, and welfare.43
Automatic Suspension Of Physicians' Licenses
One major change in Ohio's Medical Practice Act is that O.R.C. Sec.
4731.22(F) requires44 the Board to automatically suspend a physician's license
if the physician pleads guilty to, or has been found guilty45 of committing cer-
tain violent crimes.4 6 The automatic suspension operates from the date of the
guilty plea or judicial finding of guilt.47 Once the Board suspends the physi-
cian's license, continued practice will be considered practicing medicine without
a license s The Board's obligation to automatically suspend the physician's
license applies whether the criminal proceeding was brought in Ohio, any other
state or territory, or the District of Columbia."9
Once the Board has notified50 the physician of the suspension, the physi-
cian must make a timely request for an adjudicatory hearing, or the Board will
3
7Id.; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4731.23(A) (Baldwin Supp. 1987).
38OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 4731.23(A) (Baldwin Supp. 1987). The Board also receives copies of the hearing
transcript, and all documents and exhibits which were presented at the hearing. OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4731.23(B) (Baldwin Supp. 1987).
39
OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 4731.23(D( (Baldwin Supp. 1987).
4 0At least six members of the Board must vote in favor of suspending or revoking the physician's license.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4731.22(B) (Baldwin Supp. 1987).
41OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4731.23(E) (Baldwin Supp. 1987).
42OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 119.12 (Baldwin 1987).
43 Id. Any such suspension of the Board's order automatically terminates when the court of common pleas
issues its final order, or fifteen months after the physician files her/his notice of appeal with the court
of common pleas (whichever comes first). Id.
44 [material on] Am. Sub. H.B. 769 (as passed by the House), supra note 16, at 1.
45 An automatic suspension is also required when a court finds that a physician is eligible for treatment
in lieu of conviction. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4731.22(F) (Baldwin Supp. 1987).
46Id. The violent crimes listed are: aggravated murder, murder, voluntary manslaughter, felonious assault,
kidnapping, rape, sexual battery, aggravated arson, and aggravated robbery. Id.
471d.
41Snyder v. State Medical Bd., 18 Ohio App. 3d 47, 48, 480 N.E.2d 496, 497-98 (1984); see also OHIO
REv. CODE ANN. § 4731.22(F) (Baldwin Supp. 1987).
49OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4731.22(F) (Baldwin Supp. 1987).
5 The Board must notify the physician by certified mail, or in person as specified on OHIO REv. CODE
§ 119.07. Id.
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enter a final order revoking the physician's license.5t
Rather than requiring the physician to request a hearing, the Board should
probably institute proceedings simultaneously with the order of automatic
suspension. The Federation of State Medical Boards of the United States recom-
mends that when a state medical board issues an order of summary suspen-
sion, it should simultaneously institute proceedings for a formal disciplinary
hearing. 2 Although the Federation does not address the subject of automatic
suspensions, it would seem that the same recommendation should apply. In
both situations, the Board deprives a physician of the use of her/his medical
license without first affording the physician the chance to be heard.
3
Summary Suspension Of Physicians' Licenses
A second major change in Ohio's Medical Practice Act is that O.R.C. Sec.
4731.22(D) grants the Board discretionary authority5 4 to summarily suspend
a physician's license prior to a formal disciplinary hearing. 5 Formerly, the Board
had to obtain a temporary restraining order (from a court of common pleas)
against the physician's license.
5 6
Currently, if the secretary and supervising member decide there is clear
and convincing evidence that: (1) a physician has violated O.R.C. Sec.
4731.22(B)5 7 and (2) the physician's continued practice presents a danger of
immediate and serious harm to the public, they may ask the Board to summari-
ly suspend the physician's license before conducting a formal hearing.58 If the
Board votes 59 to summarily suspend the physician's license, the Board must
51Id.
12Fed. St. Med. Boards U.S., supra note 18, Sec. X(E) at 18.
s3 Orio REV. CODE ANN. § 4731.22(F) (Baldwin Supp. 1987); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 4731.22(D) (Baldwin
Supp. 1987).
54 The Federation of State Medical Boards of the United States recommends that the Board "be empowered
... to exercise full discretion and authority with respect to disciplinary actions." Fed. St. Med. Boards
U.S., supra note 18, Sec. X(A) at 18.
S5[material on] Am. Sub. H.B. 769 (as passed by the House), supra note 16, at 8.
6d.; OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 4731.22(E) (Baldwin 1984) (amended 1986).
57OHio REv. CODE § 4731.22(B) lists the grounds on which the Board may suspend or revoke a physi-
cian's license, pursuant to an adjudicatory hearing. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 4731.22(B) (Baldwin Supp.
1987).
58OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4731.22(D) (Baldwin Supp. 1987). The Federation of State Medical Boards
of the United States recommends that the Board be "authorized to summarily suspend a license prior to
a formal hearing when it believes such action is required to protect the public health and safety." Fed.
St. Med. Boards U.S., supra note 18, Sec. X(E) at 18. Thus, Ohio's "clear and convincing" standard ap-
pears to provide the Board with less discretion than the Federation recommends. The Federation's recom-
mendation is consistent with what it suggests should be the "primary responsibility and obligation" of
state medical boards: "to protect the public." Id. While the language of OHIo REv. CODE § 4731.22(D)
indicates that the legislature is interested in having the Board protect the public from dangerous physi-
cians, the "clear and convincing" standard indicates that the legislature is also interested in protecting
physicians' due process rights.
"The Board must first review the written allegations which the secretary and supervising member have
prepared. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4731.22(D) (Baldwin Supp. 1987). After reviewing the allegations,
at least six members of the Board (excluding the supervising member) must vote in favor of summarily
suspending the physician's license. Id.
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issue a written order of summary suspension to the physician. 60 The physician
may then request an adjudicatory hearing by the Board.6' If she/he does so,
the hearing must be conducted from seven to fifteen days after the physician
requests the hearing.62
O.R.C. Sec. 4731.22(D) specifically states that a summary suspension order
cannot be suspended by a court of law, pending appeal.63 At first glance, the
prohibition against suspending the Board's order appears to be in conflict with
O.R.C. Sec. 119.12 which specifically states that "[i]n the case of an appeal
from the state medical board, the court may grant a suspension and fix its terms
if' certain conditions are met 64 However, O.R.C. Sec. 119.12 deals with appeals
filed by "any party (physician) adversely affected by any order of an agency
(state medical board) issued pursuant to an adjudication. 5 The term "adjudica-
tion" implies a hearing.6 6 Therefore, the stipulation in O.R.C. Sec. 119.12 could
be construed as not applying to summary suspension orders because they are
issued prior to a formal hearing.
6 7
O.R.C. Sec. 4731.22(D) creates another conflict by requiring the Board
to issue its final adjudicative order within sixty days after completion of its
hearing.68 This provision conflicts with O.R.C. Sec. 4731.23(D) which requires
the Board to make its decision within sixty days after receiving the hearing
examiner's written proposals.69 Because the hearing examiner has thirty days
after completion of any hearing in which to prepare the proposals 70 O.R.C.
Sec. 4731.23(D) would actually give the Board as much as ninety days after
completion of the hearing in which to issue its final order. One way to resolve
the conflict is to assume that the legislature wanted the Board to act more quickly
under O.R.C. Sec. 4731.22(D) because the physician's license remains sum-
marily suspended until the Board issues its final adjudicative order!'
0 Id.
61 Id.
621d. If the physician and the Board agree to another time, the hearing may be held at the mutually agreed
upon time. Id.
63 1d.; [material on] Am. Sub. H.B. 769 (as passed by the House), supra note 16, at 8.
64 Ouio REV. CODE ANN. § 119.12 (Baldwin 1987). There are two conditions: the court must find that
(1) execution of the Board's order will result in an unusual hardship to the physician, and (2) suspension
of the Board's order will not threaten the health, safety, and welfare of the public. Id.
65
/d.
66 See "adjudication," Black's Law Dictionary 39 (5th ed. 1979).
67 OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 4731.22(D) (Baldwin Supp. 1987). The language of OHIO REV. CODE §
4731.22(D) -- "any summary suspension . . . shall remain in effect . . . until a final adjudicative order
is issued by the board.. ." - further implies that summary suspension orders were not intended to be
final adjudicative orders. Therefore, the summary suspension would not be subject to OHIO REV. CODE
§ 119.12.
68 1d.
69 0HiO REV. CODE ANN. § 4731.23(D) (Baldwin Supp. 1987).
70 OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 4731.23(A) (Baldwin Supp. 1987).
"1 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4731.22(D) (Baldwin Supp. 1987).
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To further complicate matters, if the Board fails to issue its final adjudicative
order within sixty days of the hearing's completion, O.R.C. Sec. 4731.22(D)
provides that the summary suspension automatically dissolves (but such dissolu-
tion does not invalidate any subsequent adjudicative order issued by the Board) 72
Requiring the Board to make its final decision more quickly when a physician's
license has been summarily suspended will not provide the physician with any
real advantage, because the summary suspension automatically dissolves sixty
days after the hearing has been completed, thus restoring the physician's license.
One possible result of requiring the Board to make its final decision more quickly
when a summary suspension is involved, is that the Board may make its deci-
sion in a hurried fashion. It seems that reaching a hurried decision is exactly
what the Board should not do in a case so serious that it warranted the Board's
issuing of a summary suspension initially.
The preferable way to resolve the above conflicts is for the legislature to
issue a clarification of its intent, or to amend Chapter 4731 of the Revised Code
to completely eliminate the conflicts. If the legislature does not act, the con-
flicts will undoubtedly result in litigation, and the courts will be left to second-
guess the legislature's intent.
PART II
The Medical License As Property
Since the 1960's, the concept of "the new property" 73 has led the courts
to view a variety of "indirectly valuable" items as establishing a property right
in the holder.7 4 An occupational license is one of those items.75 The courts view
occupational licenses as conveying a restricted property right on the licensee.
6
As such, a license to practice medicine has been accepted as a property right,
subject to the reasonable regulation of a state medical board
7
Procedural Due Process
After establishing the premise that a medical license creates a property
72Id.
71In 1964, an article entitled The New Property was published. Reich. The New Property; 73 YALE L.J.
733 (1964). It subsequently became the leading article on the subject, frequently cited and relied on by
various courts of law. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262, n.8 (1970).
74Reich, supra note 73, at 734. Although a piece of paper licensing a person to engage in a particular
activity has no inherent value, its value lies in what it enables its holder to obtain. Id. Generally, a profes-
sional license enables its holder to obtain her/his primary income. Id. In addition, a professional license
often provides its holder with "wealth" in the form of community status. Id.
75ld. at 734.
76Commission on Medical Discipline v. Stillman, 291 Md. 390, 405, 435 A.2d 747, 755 (1981). The prop-
erty right is restricted, rather than absolute, because the state distributes the "new property" subject to
conditions which protect the public interest. Reich, supra note 73, at 733.
77Stillman, 291 Md. at 405, 435 A.2d at 755; In Re Polk, 90 N.J. 550, 562, 449 A.2d 7, 13 (1982). (Physi-
cian's license revoked with state medical board using preponderance of the evidence standard). See also
Survey, Physicians And Surgeons, 13 SMON HALL L. REv. 654, 655 (1983).
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right in the physician, one must accept the fact that a state medical board can-
not deprive the physician of her/his license without due process of law. 8 The
crucial issue then becomes not whether due process should apply to the suspen-
sion or revocation of a physician's license, but rather, how much process is due
in administrative proceedings to fulfill the purpose of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's due process clause?
79
In 1976, the United States Supreme Court answered this question in Mathews
v. Eldridge.80 Although Mathews did not involve a state medical board pro-
ceeding, the analysis outlined in Mathews provides the current standard by which
the procedures of all administrative agencies are measured.8
In Mathews, the Supreme Court called for a three-step analysis of the private
and governmental interests affected by an administrative agency's decision to
deprive a person of a recognized property interest.8 2 Step one requires the court
to evaluate the private interest.83 Step two requires the court to determine the
degree to which the existing procedure involves a risk that the agency might
reach an erroneous decision.84 Step three requires the court to evaluate the
governmental interest.85
Step One: The Private Interest
The private interest involved in a proceeding to suspend or revoke a physi-
cian's license is, of course, the license to practice medicine.86 More extensive
consideration reveals that the license provides the physician with her/his primary
source of income8 7 as well as community and professional status. 88 Therefore,
the private interest involved would appear to be substantial.89 However, when
evaluating the private interest, the Mathews court also called for consideration
of the degree to which the person affected would be deprived of her/his
78Reich, supra note 73, at 741.
79Terrell, "Property," "Due Process," And The Distinction Between Definitions And Theory In Legal
Analysis, 70(2) GEO. L.J. 861, 883 (1982). See also Redish and Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence And
The Values Of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 456 (1986).
10 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). See also Annotation, Supreme Court's Views as to Propriety
Under Federal Constitution's Due Process Guaranties of Summary Administrative Deprivation of Prop-
erty Interest, 69 L. Ed. 2d 1044 (1982).
1 The Court in In Re Polk applied the Mathews analysis to the procedures which the New Jersey State
Board of Medical Examiners employed in revoking Dr. Polk's license. In Re Polk, 90 N.J. at 562, 449
A.2d at 13.
"2 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35.
81d. at 335.
84 Id.
851d.
'6In Re Polk, 90 N.J. at 562, 449 A.2d at 13.
"Reich, supra note 73, at 734.
8 11d. at 738.
91n Re Polk, 90 N.J. at 565, 449 A.2d at 14.
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interest. 90 "Degree" can refer to the length of deprivation as well as the amount
of deprivation?'
In Ohio, with respect to physicians' licenses, the degree to which the physi-
cian is deprived of her/his private interest varies with the type of action taken
by the Board. When the Board automatically or summarily suspends a physi-
cian's license, the suspension is not considered a final order. 2 Therefore, neither
automatic nor summary suspensions necessarily result in permanent depriva-
tion of the physician's right to practice medicine.93 In fact, even if the Board
issues a final order suspending the physician's license, O.R.C. Sec. 4731.22(G)
requires the Board to inform the physician, in writing, of the conditions under
which she/he may be reinstated to practice.
94
Another factor to consider is that when the Board issues an automatic or
summary suspension, it notifies the physician of her/his right to request a
hearing.9 5 The physician is then guaranteed a hearing within fifteen days of
when she/he requests it.96 Furthermore, if the Board fails to issue a final order
within sixty days after the hearing's completion, the summary suspension
automatically terminates.9 7 In addition, the Franklin County Court of Com-
mon Pleas is required to provide appellants of summary suspension orders with
a "hearing at the earliest possible time,' and to give such appeals "precedence
over all other actions."98
Procedurally, the legislature appears to have provided for the quickest pos-
sible action when the Board issues a summary suspension order. Although the
summary suspension deprives the physician of the use of her/his license prior
to a formal hearing,99 the time-saving procedures attempt to assure the physi-
90 1d.; Mathews, 424 U.S. at 341.
91Mathews, 424 U.S. at 341.
920IO REV. CODE ANN. § 4731.22(D) (Baldwin Supp. 1987).
931n Re Polk, 90 N.J. at 564, 449 A.2d at 14.
9 4 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 4731.22(G) (Baldwin Supp. 1987). Before a physician's license may be
reinstated, at least six members of the Board must vote in favor of the reinstatement. Id.
95OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 4731.22(D) (Baldwin Supp. 1987); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 4731.22(F) (Baldwin
Supp. 1987). Once again, the Federation of State Medical Boards of the United States recommends that
a state medical board institute proceedings for a formal hearing simultaneously with the issuance of a
summary suspension order. Fed. St. Med. Boards U.S., supra note 18, Sec. X(E) at 18. If a physician
does not request a "timely" hearing after receiving notice that her/his license has been automatically suspend-
ed, the Board will issue a final order revoking her/his license. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4731.22(F)
(Baldwin Supp. 1987). In such a case, it appears that the Board may deprive a physician of her/his license
without any hearing. This seems to run contrary to the generally accepted rule that when an administrative
agency attempts to deprive an individual of a property right some kind of hearing is required at some
point. Van Alstyne, Cracks In "The New Property": Adjudicative Due Process In The Administrative State,
62(l) CORNELL L. REv. 445, 458 (1977); see generally Friendly, Some Kind Of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L.
REv. 1267 (1975). However, the Ohio Board does provide the physician with notice of her/his right to
request a hearing, and failure to request a hearing could be viewed as a waiver of her/his right to a hearing.
960m1O REv. CODE ANN. § 4731.22(D) (Baldwin Supp. 1987).
97Id.
91OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 119.12 (Baldwin 1987).
990Hio REv. CODE ANN. § 4731.22(D) (Baldwin Supp. 1987).
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cian that she/he will not be arbitrarily deprived of her/his license for an ex-
tended period of time. Because most practicing physicians are probably not
surviving at the poverty level, it is also unlikely that suspending a physician's
license for less than a three-month period would deprive the physician of "the
very means by which she/he lives while she/he waits" for a final decision. 00
The fact that automatic and summary suspension orders are not final orders,
combined with the relatively short period of time during which the physician
is deprived of her/his right to practice medicine pursuant to these orders, in-
dicates that the automatic and summary suspension orders probably do not
violate the first level of the Mathews standard.
Step Two: The Risk Of Erroneous Deprivation
When determining the risk of error inherent in the existing procedures,
the court considers the "fairness and reliability" of the existing procedures,
as opposed to the probable value of additional procedures101 Before the Board
may summarily suspend a physician's license, it must have "clear and con-
vincing" evidence that the physician has committed a specific violation of O.R.C.
Sec. 4731.22(B), and that the physician's continued practice presents a danger
of immediate and serious harm to the public.102 While the amended statute allows
the Board to act quickly, eliminating the previous requirement of a temporary
restraining order, 0 3 the dual evidentiary requirement should provide the Board
with a "reliable" decision. 0 4
Additionally, any action taken by the Board is subject to judicial review.105
The knowledge that its actions are subject to judicial review should encourage
the Board to make "fair" decisions, rather than arbitrary ones.10 6 Further con-
tributing to a "fair" decision is the rule prohibiting any Board member who
participates in the investigation of a case from participating in the actual
1001n Goldberg, the court required a pre-deprivation hearing, partly because Kelly, a welfare recipient,
was surviving solely on government welfare payments. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264. In Mathews, the court
found that depriving Eldridge of his disability payments for approximately one year did not necessarily
place him "below the subsistence level." Mathews, 424 U.S. at 342. Therefore, a pre-deprivation hearing
was not required. id.
101 1d. at 343.
102 OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 4731.22(B( (Baldwin Supp. 1987).
0 3 0mo REV. CODE ANN. § 4731.22(E) (Baldwin 1984) (amended 1986).
104 "Reliable" is defined as "worthy of confidence." See "reliable," Black's Law Dictionary 1160 (5th ed.
1979). The Board's decision should be "reliable" because "clear and convincing" is defined as "proof
which should leave no reasonable doubt in the mind of the trier of the facts...." See "clear and convincing
proof," Black's Law Dictionary 227 (5th ed. 1979).
105Oio REV. CODE ANN. § 119.12 (Baldwin 1987).
106 Professor Reich noted that access to judicial review was essential to the prevention of arbitrary ad-
ministrative action. Reich, supra note 73, at 783. On review, the court considers the entire record, and
additional evidence that is "newly discovered and could not have been ascertained prior to the hearing
before the agency." OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 119.12 (Baldwin 1987). The court may affirm the Board's
order if the court finds "that the order is supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence, and
is in accordance with law." Id. For a discussion of the "reliable, probative, and substantial" standard of
review, see Ohio Real Estate Comm'n v. Cohen, 25 Ohio Op. 2d 165, 169, 187 N.E.2d 641, 646 (1962).
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adjudication of the case.10 7 The purpose of separating the investigative and
adjudicative functions is to protect the physician's due process rights. 08 Because
the board members who ultimately vote on the case have not taken any part
in the prior investigation of the case, the likelihood that the voting members
will be biased in their decision is decreased. 10 9 Thus, O.R.C. 4731.22(C)(1)
attempts to satisfy the due process requirement of an independent adjudicator." i0
Regarding automatic suspensions, the Board is required to suspend a physi-
cian's license when there is evidence that the physician has pled guilty to, or
has been convicted of certain violent crimes.' I I Such evidence could be presumed
"reliable" because pleas and convictions are matters of public record. Further-
more, it would hardly seem unfair to use such evidence when the physician
undoubtedly knows that the evidence exists.
The strict evidentiary standards required for the Board to issue an automatic
or summary suspension, combined with the availability of judicial review, and
the separation of investigative and adjudicative functions within the Board, in-
dicate that the automatic and summary suspension orders probably do not violate
the second level of the Mathews standard.
Step Three: The Governmental Interest
The governmental interest involved in medical board proceedings is actually
twofold. 1 2 First, in any administrative proceeding, the state has an interest in
the administrative burden of providing additional procedural safeguards,' 3I such
as a full evidentiary hearing prior to depriving a physician of her/his right to
practice medicine. At some point, the benefit afforded a physician by an addi-
tional procedure may be outweighed by the administrative costs (in terms of
time and money).'1 4 Automatic and summary suspensions are intended to be
used in extreme situations in which the Board needs to act quickly.' ' 5 Requir-
ing a full evidentiary hearing prior to license suspension would either delay
the Board's actions, or force the Board to employ additional staff. Although
10 7 0Hio REV. CODE ANN. § 4731.22(C)(1) (Baldwin Supp. 1987); [material on] Am. Sub. H.B. 769 (as
passed by the House), supra note 16, at 17.
'0 8 [material on] Am. Sub. H.B. 769 (as passed by the House), supra note 16, at 17. The Federation of
State Medical Boards of the United States recommends a separation of functions "to assure fairness" to
the physician. Fed. St. Med. Boards U.S., supra note 8, Sec. X(B) at 18. See also Fed. St. Med. Boards
U.S., A GUIDEBOOK ON MEDICAL DISCIPLINE, Sec. C(3) at 6 (1986).
109 For a discussion of the risk of bias created when investigative and adjudicative functions are combined,
see Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975). (Physician's license temporarily suspended with state medical
board using probable cause standard).
HoThe authors of one law review article propose that an independent adjudicator is the "core element"
of procedural due process. Redish and Marshall, supra note 79, at 457.
'OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4731.22(F) (Baldwin Supp. 1987).
112Annotation, supra note 80, at 1049-50.
"13Mathews, 424 U.S. at 347-49.
1141d.
'"'In Re Polk, 90 N.J. at 565-66, 449 A.2d at 14.
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the Board's staff is not limited by statute, it is limited by budget. 16 Therefore,
if the Board is financially unable to pay for more staff hours, it may be forced
to act more slowly than it deems necessary. While financial cost is not con-
trolling, it is a factor to consider"
7
The second aspect of the governmental interest is the state's obligation to
protect the public from incompetent or dangerous physicians."i 8 The "prop-
erty" right of the physician is necessarily subordinate to the state's interest in
the public's health and welfare." 9 Once again, the Ohio legislature has set up
stringent conditions under which the Board may suspend a physician's license
prior to a hearing. 20 Under these limited conditions, the public's safety must
take priority over the physician's right to practice medicine. Accordingly,
automatic and summary suspensions probably do not violate the third level of
the Mathews standard.
The last area of Ohio's Medical Practice Act which could be challenged
on due process grounds is the provision which prohibits a court from staying
a summary suspension order, pending appeal. 12' Although this statutory prohibi-
tion is new to Ohio's Medical Practice Act, other jurisdictions have held similar
provisions to be constitutional. t22 For the purposes of this comment, the pro-
hibition is best considered in relation to step three of the Mathews standard.
If the statutory prohibition has a "real and substantial relation" to public
health interests, the prohibition carries a strong presumption of constitu-
tionality.123 In evaluating the constitutionality of such prohibitions, courts have
weighed the physician's private interest in having his medical practice remain
uninterrupted (Mathews - step one), against the state's interest in protecting
the public's health (Mathews - step three).124 Unless the legislature has acted
"arbitrarily, oppressively, or unreasonably," the state's interest in protecting
the public's health will generally outweigh the physician's interest in having
his practice remain uninterrupted, pending appeal.
125
In Ohio, the Board issues summary suspension orders only when the threat
"
6 Attorney Lauren Lubow, supra note 7.
"'Mathews, 424 U.S. at 348.
Min Re Polk, 90 N.J. at 565, 449 A.2d at 14.
1191d.
20OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4731.22(D) (Baldwin Supp. 1987); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4731.22(F)
(Baldwin Supp. 1987).
121OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4731.22(D) (Baldwin Supp. 1987).
122See Annotation, Validity and Construction of State Statutory Provision Forbidding Courts to Stay, Pen-
ding Review Judgment or Order Revoking or Suspending Professional, Trade or Occupational License,
42 A.L.R.4th 516 (1985).
23Stillman, 291 Md. at 407, 435 A.2d at 756. (Physician's license revoked with court upholding statutory
prohibition against staying Commission's order pending judicial review).
1241d.
12S [d"
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to the public is greatest. 26 Therefore, the legislature would be reasonable in
concluding that the public's health might be best protected if a stay is forbidden.'
27
CONCLUSION
In response to allegations that the State Medical Board has failed to en-
force professional standards among Ohio physicians, the legislature recently
amended Ohio's Medical Practice Act. 28 Two major sections of the Act attempt
to remedy the problem of lax enforcement by giving the Board increased power
to suspend a physician's license prior to conducting a hearing.
29
In response to consumers' concerns, both automatic and summary suspen-
sions should facilitate the Board in acting quickly when a physician represents
a danger to the public's health and welfare. In response to physicians' concerns,
the Act provides for strict evidentiary standards, and adequate procedural
safeguards to prevent the Board from abusing its discretion in cases in which
a physician's license may be suspended prior to a disciplinary hearing.
With the exception of some technical conflicts between Chapter 4731 and
Chapter 119 of the Ohio Revised Code, the legislature should be commended
for its efforts in bringing Ohio's Medical Practice Act up-to-date. 30 Ohio's
legislature has acted responsibly' 3' by protecting the public's health without
violating physicians' due process rights.
32
LYNNE TUREL O'NEILL
126 0Hio REv. CODE ANN. § 4731.22(D) (Baldwin Supp. 1987).
127 Stillman, 291 Md. at 406, 435 A.2d at 756.
128Ohio Amended Substitute House Bill No. 769 (1986 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-792) (Baldwin).
1
29
0Hio REv. CODE ANN. § 4731.22(D) (Baldwin Supp. 1987); OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 4731.22(F)
(Baldwin Supp. 1987).
130 The Federation of Medical Boards of the United States recommends that all state legislatures evaluate
and revise their medical practice acts to incorporate the provisions which the Federation views as "essential"
to any modern medical practice act. Fed. St. Med. Boards U.S., supra note 18, at iii.
13' A recent editorial in the Journal of the American Medical Association concluded that "It]he success
of efforts to improve medical discipline will finally depend ... on the funding, staffing, and authority
of the state boards (of medicine). These can only come from state legislatures willing to act responsibly.
S.. [T]he effective regulation of medical practice is in their hands." Breaden, State Medical Discipline:
Defects and Hindrances, 257(6) J. AM. MED. A. 828, 829 (1987).
'3 2 [material on] Am. Sub. H.B. 769 (as passed by the House), supra note 16, at 17.
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